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I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs are the masters of their own actions.' They decide
when, where, and whom to sue. Although the law has evolved in
ways that limit a plaintiffs procedural choices,2 plaintiffs enjoy a
growing number of situations in which they can recover, and an
increase in the number of possible defendants3
For example,
governmental tort liability statutes, while limiting procedural choices,
now allow plaintiffs to sue government entities. 4
Modern
jurisdictional rules give courts a wider reach and thus enable
plaintiffs to reach more defendants in one action. 5 Perhaps most
1.
CaterpillarInc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 398-99 (1987).
2.
For example, statutes of limitations have replaced common law concepts such as
laches, more rigidly defining when a suit can be brought. See James D. Ghiardi, Computing
Time in Tort Statutes of Limitation,64 Marq. L. Rev. 575, 575 (1987).
In addition, jurisdictional rules have circumscribed the fora in which suits can be brought.
Forum non conveniens and due process still restrain jurisdiction, despite the loosening of
restrictions that followed the Supreme Court's decision in InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945). InternationalShoe made possible a "parade of new and much broader state
'long arm' statutes, which authorize the courts of a state to exercise personal jurisdiction over
nonresidents in a variety of circumstances." Peter G. McAllen, Deference to the Plaintiff in
ForumNon Conveniens, 13 S. 11. U. L. J. 191, 192 n.1 (1989). These state long-arm statutes are
vital in enabling plaintiffs to join all possible defendants in one action under comparative fault
as this Note argues should be required. For a discussion of the history of state court
jurisdiction, see Robert A. Lusardi, Nationwide Service of Process: Due ProcessLimitations on
the Powerof the Soverign, 33 Vill. L. Rev. 1, 24-32 (1988).
3.
See Philip D. Oliver, One Is Enough: A ProposedBar of the Injured Employee's Cause
of Action Against a Third Party, 58 Fordham L. Rev. 117, 127-28 (1989) (noting the increase in
vulnerability for defendants in strict liability).
4.
See, for example, Cal. Gov't Code §§ 810 et seq. (1970 & Supp. 1995). See also Jon L.
Craig, ed., 1 Civil Actions Against State and Local Government, §§ 3.4-3.6 at 182-96 (Shepard's,
2d ed. 1992).
5.
Howard P. Fink, IndispensablePartiesand the ProposedAmendment to FederalRule
19, 74 Yale L. J. 403, 436-37 (1965). The joinder reforms enacted under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and adopted in large measure by the states have greatly expanded the scope of
the modem lawsuit. Richard D. Freer, Rethinking Compulsory Joinder,60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1061,
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importantly, a plaintiffs own negligence no longer bars recovery in
most jurisdictions. 6
The advent of comparative negligence has
enabled many more plaintiffs to win judgments.
Another recent development in tort law that has greatly affected plaintiffs and defendants alike is the rejection of joint and
several liability.7 The past decade has seen a marked increase in the
number of states that have either abolished or modified the joint
liability rule8 and replaced it with some form of comparative fault.9
Under a joint liability regime, plaintiffs could sue a single
defendant and still obtain a full recovery.' 0 Under comparative fault,
however, a plaintiff may have the opportunity to sue defendants in
separate, consecutive actions, keeping a defendant in reserve as a
hedge against a bad result in the first case." This possibility creates
inefficiencies that do not exist in joint liability regimes.
This Note identifies the barriers and disincentives to sue all
defendants in one action in a comparative fault jurisdiction, the costs
associated with these disincentives, and a possible solution in the
form of a one-action rule for systems of comparative negligence without joint and several liability. Part II of this Note reviews the developments of the doctrines of comparative negligence and comparative
fault and the corresponding demise of contributory negligence and
joint liability. In addition, Part II notes the procedural differences in
a joint liability regime and one employing comparative fault. 12 Part

1065-67 (1985). Joint and several liability was formulated in a time when these modem
procedural tools were unavailable. See text accompanying notes 35-39.
6.
To date, forty-six states have adopted some form of comparative negligence by statute
or judicial proceeding. See Victor E. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence § 1-1 at 4 (Michie,
1994). See also id. § 1-1 at 2 (observing: "The march of comparative negligence turned into a
parade...").
7.
Id. § 15-4 at 308-12.

8.

Id. § 15-4 at 308-09.

9.
For purposes of this Note, the terms "comparative fault" and "comparative negligence"
have distinct meanings. See Schneider National Inc. v. HollandHitch Co., 843 P.2d 561, 566
n.4 (Wyo. 1992). As noted by the Schneider National court:
"Comparative negligence" defines the doctrinal change created by the legislative adoption.., of principles limiting the effect of contributory negligence and measuring negligence in percentage terms for the purpose of reducing the plaintiff's recovery in proportion to the percentage of negligence attributed to that actor. Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-109(a), (b)
and (c). "Comparative fault" principles apportion damage recovery among multiple or
joint tortfeasors according to the percentage of fault attributed to those actors after reduction for the plaintiffs percentage of negligence. Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-109(d).
Id. "Comparative negligence," thus defined, replaces contributory negligence, and "comparative
fault" replaces joint liability.
10.
See text accompanying notes 52-55.
11.
See Part III.
12.
See note 9 for the distinction between comparative negligence and comparative fault.
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III illustrates the possibilities for inefficient plaintiff behavior created
by the modification of joint liability. Part III also observes that some
courts have not stopped multiple litigation, despite their recognition
of the inefficiencies of strategic behavior by plaintiffs. Part IV argues
that comparative fault systems should, therefore, contain mandatory
joinder provisions to combine the procedural efficiency ofjoint liability
with the substantive fairness of comparative fault.
II. THE ADVENT OF COMPARATIVE FAULT AND THE DEMISE
OF JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY

A. From ContributoryNegligence to ComparativeNegligence
In 1950 only five jurisdictions in the United States applied
comparative negligence to most negligence cases.13 By 1995, forty-six
states had adopted comparative negligence by either legislative or
judicial action. 1 This move toward comparative negligence has been
defined as a reaction against the harsh results of the contributory
negligence defense available at common law. 15 Contributory negligence foreclosed recovery for any plaintiff who was negligent, even if
that negligence was slight in comparison to the defendant's.
Comparative negligence reformed this system by allowing a plaintiff
to recover damages in proportion to the fault of the defendants.
The first states to adopt comparative negligence generally did
so by legislative action. 16 In states where the legislature had not
acted, courts generally felt constrained to continue to follow the rule
of contributory negligence, 17 although many courts believed that the
contributory negligence defense produced unfair results and was of
dubious legal pedigree. 18 A breakthrough in the judicial adoption of
13. Schwartz, ComparativeNegligence § 1-1 at 2 (cited in note 6).
14. Id. § 1-1 at 4.
15. Id. § 1.2 (noting, however, that there is "ample evidence that comparative negligence
preceded contributory negligence in point of time"). See generally Gary T. Schwartz,
Contributoryand ComparativeNegligence: A Reappraisal,87 Yale L. J. 697 (1978) (concluding
comparative negligence is preferable for both economic and equitable reasons).
16. Georgia adopted a system of comparative negligence for railroad workers by statute in
1860. See Ga. Code Ann. § 46-8-291; Ga. Code Ann. § 94-703. Mississippi legislatively adopted
comparative negligence for all actions in 1910. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-15. See generally
Schwartz, ComparativeNegligence § 1-4 at 12-18.
17. See, for example, Maki v. Frelk, 40 Ill.2d 193, 239 N.E.2d 445 (1968). See generally
Schwartz, ComparativeNegligence § 1-5(b), (c) at 21-24 (summarizing cases).
18. See, for example, Rossman v. La Grega, 28 N.Y.2d 300, 270 N.E.2d 313, 317 (1971)
(describing contributory negligence as "a legal concept that created an artificial dichotomy that
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comparative negligence occurred in the mid-1970s when the supreme
courts of Florida 9 and California20 instituted the doctrine. Since then,
ten more states have judicially adopted comparative negligence.21
Typically, following the adoption of comparative negligence by
the courts, state legislatures codified the doctrine during the wave of
tort-law reform that swept the nation in the 1980s. 22 Thus, in retrospect, the reluctance of the courts to make significant steps toward
reform in the area of tort law was not justified. No legislature has
reversed a state supreme court decision instituting comparative negligence. Rather, the legislatures have stepped in and codified the
principle in question, allowing for more efficient and uniform
implementation.
B. From JointLiability to ComparativeFault
As state legislatures began to reform the tort system, they
faced questions that the (often judicial) decision to move to compara-

persisted all through the nineteenth century and is slowly yielding now to the persistent arguments of its critics that it is at once unfair and not well founded in legal principle").
Nevertheless, the court in Rossman refused to implement comparative negligence, finding it
unnecessary on the facts of that case. The court noted that Dean Prosser had spoken of contributory negligence, in his famous phrase, as the "chronic invalid who will not die." Id. at 316
(quoting William Lloyd Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 428 (West, 3d ed. 1964)). For
further understanding of the criticisms leveled against contributory negligence in the academic
literature, see generally Charles L. B. Lowndes, Contributory Negligence, 22 Georgetown L. J.
674, 709 (1934) (cited in Rossman and calling contributory negligence "unjust and illogical");
Albert Averbach, Comparative Negligence Legislation: A Cure for our Congested Courts, 19
Albany L. Rev. 4 (1955); Kenneth P. Grubb, Observations on ComparativeNegligence, 23 Ohio
Bar 237 (1950); John J. Haugh, ComparativeNegligence: A Reform Long Overdue, 49 Or. L.
Rev. 38 (1969).
19. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 S.2d 431, 436 (Fla. 1973) (reasoning that "[legislative action
could, of course, be taken, but we abdicate our own function, in a field peculiarly nonstatutory,
when we refuse to reconsider an old and unsatisfactory court-made rule" (emphasis deleted))
(quoting Gates v. Foley, 247 S.2d 40, 43 (Fla. 1971)).
20. Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of California, 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226 (1975). The
California court abrogated contributory negligence despite the fact that it had been statutorily
enacted in 1872. Schwartz, ComparativeNegligence § 1-5(e) at 28 (cited in note 6).
21. Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska, 1975); Placek v. Sterling Heights, 405 Mich.
638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979); Bradley v. AppalachianPower Co., 163 W.Va. 332, 256 S.E.2d 879
(1979); Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981); Alvis v. Ribar,85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d
886 (1981); Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742 (Iowa 1982); Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d
11 (Mo. 1983); Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1984); Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 303 S.C.
243, 399 S.E.2d 783 (1991); McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1992).
22. See Appendix A of Schwartz, ComparativeNegligence (cited in note 6) (cataloging the
adoption of comparative negligence by the various states).
For examples of statutory
enactments that followed judicial adoption, see Alaska Stat. § 09.17.040 to .900 (1993); Cal. Civ.
Code § 1431.2 (West Supp. 1995); Fla. Stat. § 768.81 (West Supp. 1995); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 735,
22 5/2-1107.1, 5/2-1116 (Smith-Hurd 1992); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 411.182 (1992).
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Many state legislatures

simply enacted comparative negligence using broad language and left
the details up to the courts.24 Increasingly, however, legislatures have
become more activist in dealing with the collateral issues involved in
a comparative negligence system.

25

One of the areas in which legisla-

tures have been most active is in deciding whether or not to modify or
abolish the doctrine of joint and several liability. By 1995, thirty-four
of the forty-five comparative fault jurisdictions had amended their
26
law on joint and several liability by legislative action.
All comparative fault systems attempt to balance two conflicting objectives. One is that each person involved in an action be liable
only in proportion to his or her share of the total fault. 27 The other is
that full compensation be awarded to injured plaintiffs. 28 These competing goals represent conflicting values and cannot both be given
29
priority by any given system.

23. These issues included the continued viability of joint and several liability, whether a
large proportion of fault would still preclude recovery by a plaintiff, and the apportionment of
fault to nonparties. Schwartz, ComparativeNegligence § 2-3 at 41-52.
24. Id. § 2-3 (b) at 43.
25. See id.
26. See Alaska Stat. § 9.17.080; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-2506 (West 1994); Cal. Civ.
Code §§ 1431-1431.5 (West Supp. 1995); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-111.5 (West 1989 & Supp.
1994); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-572h (West 1991 & Supp. 1994); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.81 (3)(5) (West Supp. 1995); Ga. Code Ann. § 51-12-33 (Michie Supp. 1994); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 66310.9 (1988 & Supp. 1994); Idaho Code § 6-803 (1990 & Supp. 1994); IM. Ann. Stat. § 5/2-1117 to
-1118 (Smith-Hurd 1992); Ind. Code Ann. § 34-4-33-5 (West 1986); Iowa Code Ann. § 668.4 (West
1987); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-258a (1983); La. Civ. Code Ann. § 2324 (West Supp. 1995); Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.6304 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604.02 (West 1988
& Supp. 1995); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 537.067 (Vernon 1988); Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-703 (1993);
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.141 (1986 & Supp. 1993); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 507:7-e (Equity Supp.
1994); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:15-5.2 to -5.4 (West Supp. 1994); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-3A-1 (1989);
N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & M. Law 1601-1602 (McKinney Supp. 1995); N.D. Cent. Code § 32-03.2-02
(Supp. 1993); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.31-.32 (Baldwin 1993); Or. Rev. Stat. § 18.485 (1988);
S.D. Cod. Laws § 15-8-15.1 (Supp. 1994); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 33.013 (Vernon
Supp. 1995); Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-40 (1992 & Supp. 1994); 12 Vt. Stat. Ann. § 1036 (Equity
Supp. 1994); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 4.22.070 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995); Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-109(d)
(1988 & Supp. 1994). Two other jurisdictions accomplished the same result by judicial decision.
See Boyles v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 619 P.2d 613 (Old. 1980); McIntyre v. Balentine, 833
S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1992).
27. Leonard E. Eilbacher, Nonparty Tortfeasors in Indiana: The Early Cases, 21 Ind. L.
Rev. 413, 413 (1988). Professor Eilbacher calls apportioned liability the cornerstone principal of
comparative fault. To the extent that state legislatures have written statutes that give this goal
priority over compensation, proportionality has become the primary function of tort law. This
Note both advocates such an emphasis and assumes that it is the normative situation in the
majority of states.
28. W. Page Keeton, et al., eds., Prosserand Keeton on the Law of Torts § 4 at 20 (West,
5th ed. 1984) (student ed.).
29. Eilbacher, 21 Ind. L. Rev. at 413 (cited in note 27) (observing that "[tihe fairness of any
system of comparative fault ... is in the eye of the beholder').
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Allocating the fault of nonparties in tort cases, especially when
they are insolvent, is at the center of the debate on joint and several
liability.30 The presence of an insolvent party generally means either
that an injured plaintiff receives less than full compensation, or that
solvent defendants are liable for an amount greater than their
proportional fault. In jurisdictions retaining joint and several liability, the burden of insolvency falls upon the party defendants who are
forced to pay the full amount of the plaintiffs injuries, regardless of
the proportion of their fault.3 1 In a jurisdiction that has abolished
joint and several liability, this burden falls on the plaintiff.32 These
Some jurisdictions have
two positions represent the extremes.
reached a middle position by allocating the share of an insolvent tortfeasor among all parties, including the plaintiff, in proportion to their
relative fault33 However, the modern trend away from joint liability
is still inherently a choice of proportional fault and, therefore, fairness
3
for defendants over full compensation for plaintiffs. 4
Joint and several liability was instituted under very different
circumstances than exist today.3 5 First, at the time joint and several
liability developed, contributory negligence completely barred recovery;36 only innocent plaintiffs could recover. Comparing the tortfeasor
to the innocent plaintiff, it did not seem unfair that the guilty party
bear the risk of other insolvent, immune, unreachable, or unknown
defendants. Secondly, it was widely believed that juries were incapa30. Id. at 414.
31. Supporters ofjoint liability justify this burden on defendants because they were one of
the "but for" causes of the plaintiff's injury. Richard W. Wright, Allocating Liability Among
Multiple Responsible Causes: A PrincipledDefense of Joint and Several Liability for Actual
Harm and Risk Exposure, 21 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1141, 1152-53 (1988).
32. See, for example, Ind. Code. Ann. § 34-4-33-7 (West 1986) (abolishing contribution).

Under this scheme, the party defendants must pay only the portion of the total judgment that
relates to their comparative fault. In sole-tortfeasor cases, the burden of an insolvent defendant
would fall on the plaintiff exclusively. Some commentators have argued that there is no princi-

pled basis for shifting that risk in multiple-defendant cases.

Carol A. Mutter, Moving to

Comparative Negligence in an Era of Tort Reform: Decisions for Tennessee, 57 Tenn. L. Rev.
199, 313 (1990).
33. Minnesota, for example, reallocates among all parties including the plaintiff, Minn.
Stat. Ann. § 604.02 (2). In comparison, Connecticut reallocates only among defendants. Conn.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-572h(g).
34. This shift has been justified in part as a quid pro quo for the abolition of contributory
negligence. Mutter, 57 Tenn. L. Rev. at 319 (cited in note 32). Professor Mutter argues that

"most of these legislative modifications lack intellectual rigor;, they are truly the product of
political give-and-take. Nonetheless, they represent a consensus that joint and several liability

should not coexist equally with comparative fault." Id. at 318.
35. See Warren Freedman, Joint and Several Liability: Allocation of Risk and
Apportionment of Damages 7 (Butterworth, 1987) (describing common law limitations on

joinder).
36.

Mutter, 57 Tenn. L. Rev. at 306 (cited in note 32).
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ble of apportioning fault among several defendants. 7 The advent of
comparative fault has undercut the first rationale8 and rests upon the
converse of the second.3 9
The very basis of comparative negligence is that the relative
fault of individual actors can be determined and that each actor
should be held responsible for that degree of fault.4 The basic fairness concerns that led to the demise of contributory negligence also
militate against the continued use of joint and several liability.41 If it
is unjust for a plaintiff who is ten percent negligent to recover nothing, it is equally unacceptable to require a defendant who is ten percent at fault to pay the entire recovery, especially when the plaintiffs
fault is greater. Many statutes that have modified, but retained,
some form of joint liability recognize this inequity and hold a
defendant jointly liable only if the defendant's fault is relatively large
42
in comparison to the plaintiffs fault.
The inequities that can result from retaining pure joint and
several liability in comparative negligence jurisdictions are illustrated
in many cases, one of which is Dunham v. Kampman.43 In Dunham a
husband and wife, while riding a motorcycle, collided with an auto-

37. Id.
38. Id. at 306-07. However, some jurisdictions retain joint and several liability for defendants whose negligence is great. See, for example, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A.15-5.3a. In these
jurisdictions, the defendant usually retains a right of contribution. See, for example, N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 2A15-5.3e. Other jurisdictions still follow joint and several liability when the plaintiffs
negligence is minimal or nonexistant. See, for example, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §
33.013 (b)(2) and (c)(1). In addition, joint and several liability is often retained for intentional
torts. See, for example, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-3A-1 (C)(1).
39. Damon Ball, A Reexamination of Joint and Several Liability Under a Comparative
Negligence System, 18 St. Mary's L. J. 891, 898 (1987). Ball notes that:
Comparative negligence recognizes the ability of a court to determine and apportion damages in relation to the harm caused. Joint and several liability, in contrast,
presumes the inability of the judiciary to divide fault among parties. To continue to hold
multiple defendants liable for the total amount of damage, when a mechanism for apportioning damages is available, contravenes fundamental fairness.
Id.
40. Id. at 898 (arguing that since comparative negligence allows for the division of fault,
"the law of joint and several liability must be repudiated and each defendant held accountable
only for the percentage of damages found by the trier of fact to have been caused by his con-

duc").
41. See Victor E. Schwartz and Liberty Mahshigian, A Permanent Solution for Product
Liability Crises: Uniform Federal Tort Law Standards, 64 Denver U. L. Rev. 685, 699 (1988)
(advocating the abolition of joint and several liability in favor of proportional fault). But see
John W. Wade, Should Joint and Several Liability of Multiple Tortfeasors be Abolished?, 10 Am.
J. Trial Advoc. 193, 193 (1986) (supporting the continued use ofjoint and several liability).
42. See note 38.
43. 547 P.2d 263 (Colo. App. 1976), affd en banc, 560 P.2d 91 (Colo. 1977). Colorado has
since abolished joint liability for defendants in a negligence action and substituted comparative
fault. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-111.5 (1).
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mobile. 44 In the following suit, the jury found the husband, who drove
the motorcycle, to be ninety-nine percent at fault and the automobile
driver one percent at fault.45 Although Colorado's comparative negligence statute prevented the husband from recovering damages from
the defendant, operation of joint and several liability required the
defendant to compensate the wife for the entire amount of her injuries
because her husband was immune from liability.46

Much of the drive to modify joint and several liability resulted
from a perceived insurance "crisis" in tort law.47 Local governments,

often targeted as "deep-pocket" defendants with relatively low comparative fault,48 cited joint and several liability as a cause for
increasing taxes and decreasing services. 49 The call for tort reform,
based on this perceived crisis, overwhelmed state legislatures across
the nation in the mid-1980s.5O Many state legislatures responded
with wide-ranging abolition and modification of the joint and several
liability rule.5'

44. 547 P.2d at 265.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Larry Pressler and Kevin V. Schieffer, Joint and Several Liability: A Case for Reform,
64 Denver U. L. Rev. 651, 654 (1988).
48. Id. at 654-55 (collecting examples of municipal liability for "passive" negligence leading
to large recoveries because ofjoint liability with a more culpable "active" tortfeasor).
49. Id. at 654 (citing National Institute of Municipal Law Officers, Report of the Committee
on Municipal Tort Liability 35-38 (Oct. 1984)).
50. Id. at 656-69.
51. Id. Critics have since argued that the state legislative reforms in the area ofjoint and
several liability were the product of misunderstanding and confusion. Others disagree.
Professors Richard W. Wright and Aaron D. Twerski, for example, carried on a running debate
on the merits of these reforms in the University of California at Davis Law Review. See
generally Richard W. Wright, Allocating Liability Among Multiple Responsible Causes: A
PrincipledDefense of Joint and Several Liabilityfor Actual Harm and Risk Exposure, 21 U.C.
Davis L. Rev. 1141 (1988); Aaron D. Twerski, The Joint Tortfeasor Legislative Revolt: A
Rational Response to the Critics, 22 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1125 (1989); Richard W. Wright,
Throwing Out the Baby with the Bathwater: A Reply to ProfessorTwerski, 22 U.C. Davis L. Rev.
1147 (1989); Aaron D. Twerski, The Baby Swallowed the Bathwater: A Rejoinder to Professor
Wright, 22 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1161 (1989).
Professor Twerski contends that the state legislatures that modified, and sometimes abolished, joint and several liability were not confused, nor did they ignore the question of who
should bear the risk of an insolvent defendant. Twerski, 22 U.C. Davis L. Rev. at 1129. But see
Mutter, 57 Tenn. L. Rev. at 318 (cited in note 32) (stating that "these legislative modifications
lack[ed] intellectual rigor"). Rather, the legislatures' decisions reflected an honest attempt to
strike a fair balance between plaintiffs and defendants in tort cases. Twerski, 22 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. at 1130-32.
According to Professor Twerski, two considerations motivated these reforms. First, legislatures believed that joint and several liability served to compound unfairness that existed in the
tort system. Id. at 1132. Secondly, legislatures identified as a real problem what Professor
Twerski calls "institutionally immune" defendants that force plaintiffs to sue "deep pockets" to
obtain a full recovery. Id. at 1132-33.
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C. A ProceduralComparisonof ComparativeFault
and JointLiability
The rise of comparative fault and the demise of joint and several liability have significantly altered the dynamics of an action in
which there are at least two party defendants possibly at fault.
Under joint and several liability, a plaintiff may choose to sue only
one defendant, usually the so-called deep-pocket, and recover all her
damages from that party.52 The defendant would institute an action
for contribution against the other tortfeasors, assuming a right of
contribution existed in the jurisdiction. 55 The method of determining
the amount of money each co-tortfeasor owed in contribution varied,
but generally involved dividing the amount of the judgment into equal
shares on a pro-rata basis5 4 In jurisdictions that have adopted
comparative fault and retained joint and several liability, the
preferred method is to require contribution based on the relative
findings of fault in the original action. 55 In either situation, the party
defendants are responsible for collecting from all nonparty co-tortfeasors and bear the risk of nonrecovery.
In jurisdictions that have abolished joint and several liability,
however, the burden of collecting from each separate tortfeasor falls
upon the plaintiff. Each defendant is responsible to the plaintiff only
for its share of the total damages as apportioned by the findings of
comparative fault. 56

This shifted burden removes one incentive for

the plaintiff to sue only the deep pocket. However, it creates new
57
troublesome incentives that tort-reform statutes have not addressed.
52.
states:

For legislative recognition of this phenomenon, see Cal. Civ. Code § 1431.1(a), which

The legal doctrine of joint and several liability, also known as "the deep pocket
rule", has resulted in a system of inequity and injustice that has threatened financial
bankruptcy of local governments, other public agencies, private individuals and businesses and has resulted in higher prices for goods and services to the public and in
higher taxes to the taxpayers.
53.

See, for example, Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, 12 U.LA. 63 (1955).

54. Id. § 2 at 87.
55. This method assumes the nonjoined tortfeasors' fault was adjudicated in the first
action. Some states allow judgments to determine only the fault of parties to the suit. See, for
example, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2315.19(B)(4) (1994). See generally Schwartz, Comparative
Negligence § 15-5(a) at 313-16 (cited in note 6). In these jurisdictions, a defendant must attempt
to join any co-tortfeasors.
56. See, for example, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-40 (stating that "the maximum amount for
which a defendant may be liable to any person seeking recovery is that percentage or proportion
of the damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion of fault attributed to that defendant.
No defendant is entitled to contribution from any other person!).
57. Two states, Oklahoma and Tennessee, have amended their doctrines of joint and
several liability through common law rather than by statute. See Boyles v. Oklahoma Natural
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III. THE PROBLEM OF INEFFICIENT BEHAVIOR BY PLAINTIFFS IN
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE JURISDICTIONS WITH

MODIFIED JOINT LIABILITY

A A Descriptionof the Problem
Changes in the law of joint and several liability have created
new opportunities for inefficient plaintiff behavior.5 8 With joint and
several liability, a plaintiff needed to bring only one action to recover
her full damages. The defendant was then responsible for a second
action to obtain contribution from nonjoined parties. 59 Under joint
and several liability, joinder rules allowed defendants to join any
potentially liable party that was not initially joined by the plaintiff as
a third-party defendant to the original action. 60 As a result, for all
practical purposes, all litigation occured efficiently in one case. This

Gas Co., 619 P.2d 613, 616-17 (Old. 1980) (holding that a comparative fault statute does not
replace joint and several liability when the plaintiff is nonnegligent) and McIntyre v. Balentine,
833 S.W.2d 52, 58 (Tenn. 1992) (adopting comparative fault and rendering joint and several
liability obsolete). The Tennessee Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed its holding in
McIntyre. See Bervoets v. Hardy Ralls Pontiac-Olds,Inc., 891 S.W.2d 905, 907 (Tenn. 1994)
(stating that McIntyre indeed abolished joint and several liability, but did not abolish
contribution). To date efficiency concerns have been addressed by the courts and not the
legislatures. This Note calls for judicial and legislative action in this context. See Part IV.B.
58. One possible solution to this behavior would be to retain joint and several liability,
thereby making multiple actions by the claimant moot. This option should be rejected for the
same reasons comparative fault has been enacted. This Note assumes that the reinstatement of
joint and several liability is neither a realistic possibility nor a sound policy choice. For a defense ofjoint and several liability in the context of statutory construction, see James J. Scheske,
Comment, The Reform of Joint and Several Liability Theory: A Survey of State Approaches, 54
J. Air L. & Comm. 627 (1988).
59. See, for example, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-11-101 to -106 (1980), Tennessee's version of
the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. A version of the act has been adopted in 19
states. Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, 12 U.L.A. 80, 80 (West Supp. 1994). Of
course, a defendant may fail in its attempt to recover in a second action. See Richard D. Freer,
Avoiding Duplicative Litigation: Rethinking Plaintiff Autonomy and the Court's Role in
Defining the Litigative Unit, 50 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 809, 830 (1989) (noting the harm of
underinclusive joinder to a defendant who is unable to recover from a jointly liable tortfeasor in
a separate action).
60. See, for example, F.R.C.P. 14. If the party whom the defendant wished to join was not
subject to the jurisdiction of the court, the defendant was forced to initiate a second action for
contribution in another jurisdiction. This situation necessitated a new trial on the merits
because the contribution defendant could not be bound by the judgment in the first case.
If an unknown party had been at fault along with a named defendant, the defendant would
shoulder the entire burden of the judgment under joint liability. Without joint liability, an
empty chair defense may be available to the defendant to place liability on an absent party. If
fault is attributed to an unknown party, the plaintiff and the named defendants usually bear the
burden of the nonrecovery in proportion to their relative fault. See note 33.
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process conserved judicial resources and eliminated the danger of
inconsistent judgments.61
Without joint and several liability, a plaintiff may choose to
bring two or more separate actions to obtain full compensation for her
injuries. 62 A plaintiff may bring separate actions for purely strategic
purposes. That is, a plaintiff may keep a defendant in reserve so that
if the first trial did not result in a sufficient judgment, she would have
a second chance at a satisfactory recovery. 63 This strategy is even
more tempting in a jurisdiction that follows the Uniform Comparative
Fault Act, which mandates that only the fault of the present party
defendants can be at issue in a case.64 In either situation, the plaintiff
61. Inconsistent judgments lead to an inefficient allocation of deterrence. See text accompanying notes 179-81. This Note uses the term inefficiency to refer both to this misallocation of
deterrence and to the waste of judicial resources inherent when plaintiffs are allowed to
maintain two separate actions for the same injury.
62. Such a result would most frequently occur when one defendant is a government entity
and the second is a private party who has a right to jury trial under a state constitution. Again,
the result is judicial inefficiency and the possibility of inconsistent judgments. This problem
could be eliminated if the comparative negligence statute made government entities subject to
the mandatory joinder requirements this Note suggests. Government entities would then be
subject to jury determinations of their liability, percentage of fault, and damage valuations.
Governments have resisted subjecting themselves to jury trials because they believe that juries
too willingly set high damage figures and assess high percentages of fault to "deep pocket"
defendants. These beliefs have not been proven. In fact, the evidence is very ambiguous as to
whether judges or juries are preferable to "deep pockets." See generally Michael J. Saks, Do We
Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1147 (1992). Even if juries pose a danger to the public fisc in adjudicating the government's liability, state legislatures could impose damage caps on the amount that can be
recovered from government entities in a tort case. See, for example, Wis. Stat. Ann. § 893.80(3)
(West 1983) (creating a $50,000 cap on damages recoverable from governmental agencies). With
or without damage caps, this situation is preferable to requiring two separate actions.
63. The plaintiff is the only party who has a motive to "hide" a potentially liable party.
Defendants always have incentive to join any party they believe to be negligent in an effort to
reduce the amount of their own comparative fault. See Part III.B.
64. Uniform Model Comparative Fault Act § 2(a), 12 U.LA. 42 (1977). A party who has
been released from liability by operation of some kind of immunity may also have fault apportioned by the court. The comment explains why the drafters took this position:
The limitation to parties to the action means ignoring other persons who may have been
at fault with regard to the particular injury but who have not been joined as parties.
This is a deliberate decision. It cannot be told with certainty whether that person was
actually at fault or what amount of fault should be attributed to him, or whether he will
ever be sued, or whether the statute of limitations will run on him, etc. An attempt to
settle these matters in a suit to which he is not a party would not be binding on him.
Both plaintiff and defendants will have significant incentive for joining defendants
who may be liable. The more parties joined whose fault contributed to injury, the
smaller the percentage of fault allocated to each of the other parties, whether plaintiff or
defendant.
Id. at 50 (West Supp. 1994).
This line of reasoning makes two assumptions: first, that the plaintiff has a reason to have
her percentage of fault lowered; and second, that the defendant knows the identity of all parties
who are possibly at fault. The first assumption does not hold true when applied to a completely
innocent plaintiff. As noted above, plaintiffs have more motive for strategic behavior than the
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has an incentive to sue one party, often the "deep pocket," first and
reserve other defendants for possible future actions involving the
same injury.65
This practice occurs despite the fact that the majority of states
have adopted so-called "mandatory joinder" provisions based on Rule
19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.6 Federal Rule 19 and its
state progeny mandate the joinder of persons required for a 'Just
adjudication!' of the case 67 and require the plaintiff to identify all such
nonjoined parties in the complaint. The rule does not, however,
address the sanction for failure to identify nonjoined, but potentially
liable, parties in the complaint.68 This Note argues that states should
drafters of the act conceived. Therefore, the one solution for both inefficient behavior by
plaintiffs and fault apportionment to nonparties is to eliminate nonparties through mandatory
joinder. To be sure, mandatory joinder would not eliminate all nonparties, such as unknown
actors or those who cannot be joined for procedural or jurisdictional reasons. In these
situations, the party defendants should be allowed to use an "empty chair" defense. Otherwise,
the principal goal of comparative fault, proportional liability, would not be achieved.
65. Plaintiffs have this incentive especially if, even apart from the issue of solvency, juries
are in fact more likely to find liability, or a higher percentage of fault, in the case of a "deep
pocket." See note 62. Even if the plaintiff does not consciously anticipate a second action, an
adverse result in the first action may cause the plaintiff to consider other potentially liable
parties. These actions will tend to involve product liability claims because the statute of limitations for these claims is longer than that 6f other torts. See Kathios v. General Motors Corp.,
862 F.2d 944 (1st Cir. 1988), as an example of this behavior. Kathios is discussed in detail in
Part III.B. See also note 101 (discussing the role that statutes of limitations may play in plaintiffs actions).
66. Thirty-four states have provisions modeled closely on the federal rule, and many are
identical. See Ala. R. Civ. P. 19; Alaska R. Civ. P. 19; Ariz. St. R. Civ. P. 19; Arkansas R. Civ.
P. 19; Cal. Civ. P. Code § 389 (West 1973); Colo. R. Civ. P. 19; Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 19; Ga.
Code Ann. § 9-11-19 (Michie 1993); Hawaii R. Civ. P. 19; Idaho R. Civ. P. 19; Ind. R. Trial P.
19; Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 60-202, 60-219 (1994); Ky. R. Civ. P. 19.01-.03; Me. R. Civ. P. 19; Mass.
R. Civ. P. 19; Minn. R. Civ. P. 19.01-.04; Mont. Code Ann. § 25-20, Rule 19 (1993); Nev. R. Civ.
P. 19; N.J. Rules of General Application R. 4:28-1; N.M. D.Ct. R. Civ. P. 1-019; N.Y. Civ. P. L. &
R. Law § 1001 (McKinney 1976); N.D. R. Civ. P. 19; Ohio R. Civ. P. 19; 12 Okla. Stat. Ann. §
2019 (West 1993); S.C. R. Civ. P. 19; S.D. Cod. Laws § 15-6-19 (1984); Tenn. R. Civ. P. 19.01-.04;
Tex. R. Civ. P. 39; Utah R. Civ. P. 19; Vt. R. Civ. P. 19; Wash. Civ. R. 19; W.Va. R. Civ. P. 19;
Wyo. R. Civ. P. 19.
67. Rule 19 requires joinder when the joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction
and:
in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties,
or [] the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated
that the disposition of the action in the person's absence may (i) as a practical matter
impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest.
F.R.C.P. 19(a).
68. The rule states that a "pleading asserting a claim for relief shall state the names, if
known to the pleader, of any persons [required for just adjudication] who are not joined, and the
reasons why they are not joined." Id. at 19(c). The rule empowers a court to dismiss an action
when an indispensable person is not joined. Id. at 19(b). One of the factors considered in
dismissal is future prejudice to the absent person if the suit is allowed to proceed. Id. at 19(b),
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make the failure to join potentially liable persons a bar to future actions.
A plaintiff's ability to bring multiple actions in comparative
fault regimes has resulted in a loss of efficiency. The Supreme Court
has noted the obvious inefficiency that results when a defendant is
forced to litigate the merits of a case that a plaintiff has lost in
previous litigation. 9 In a comparative fault context, plaintiffs may
"lose" when the result of the first trial leaves them with either no
recovery or with less recovery than they believe justified.7 0 In
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois
Foundation,7 1 the Court strongly criticized the possibility of multiple
actions when it noted that allowing serial litigation against successive
defendants represents a lack of discipline or interest by the courts
and encourages plaintiffs to pursue inappropriate strategies.72 This
same inefficiency occurs when a plaintiff sues multiple tortfeasors,
voluntarily or involuntarily, in serial actions involving the same or
new theories of liability.
Joint and several liability schemes that allowed for the joinder
of third-party defendants gave defendants incentives to join all potentially liable parties.73 Controversies were litigated efficiently in one
action. The shift to comparative fault removed these incentives
because henceforth defendants were liable only for their share of the
plaintiffs injury. The loss of this efficiency-enhancing aspect of joint
and several liability cannot be an intended result of tort reform. As
discussed in sub-Part B below, there is a split among courts about
whether to bar serial suits. This Note, thus, proposes barring
successive suits, a solution that would recapture the efficiency of the
advisory committee's note. Courts have considered this factor in barring excessive suits, but not
because of a failure to follow the dictate of Rule 19. See notes 94 and 167.
69. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313,
329 (1971). Concerns about efficency become more paramount as the form of litigation becomes
more complex.
See Julia Christine Bunting, Recent Development, Ashley v. Abbott
Laboratories: Reconfiguring the Personal JurisdictionAnalysis in Mass Tort Litigation, 47
Vand. L. Rev. 189, 230-32 (1994) (discussing judicial economy and efficiency in the context of
jurisdiction in mass tort litigation).
70. See Part I.B (discussing cases in which plaintiffs initiated second suits).
71. 402 U.S. 313.
72. Id. at 329 (quoting Kerotest Manufacturing Co. v. C-O-Two Co., 342 U.S. 180, 185
(1952)). Specifically the Court stated:
[p]ermitting repeated litigation of the same issue as long as the supply of unrelated defendants holds out reflects either the aura of the gaming table or "a lack of discipline
and of disinterestedness on the part of the lower courts, hardly a worthy or wise basis
for fashioning rules of procedure."

Id.
73. Virtually all jurisdictions allowed such joinder under provisions similar to the F.R.C.P.
See note 66.
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joint and several liability system without compromising the
substantive gains achieved through comparative fault.
B. The Split among the Courts
The issue that most often confronts courts facing multiple
actions is whether doctrines akin to res judicata or claim preclusion
bar a plaintiff from bringing a second claim against a new defendant.7 4 Courts that have barred successive suits have relied on several theories to preclude them, including the entire controversy
' and statutory interpretation.77
doctrine,7' 5 collateral estoppel,76
These
courts have held that the inefficiencies and inequities of allowing
multiple actions counsel against allowing such actions. In contrast,
courts refusing to implement a ban on successive actions have done so
because they did not believe that such a ban was within the spirit of
the comparative fault statute,7' 8 because the fault of the plaintiff
relative to the defendant in the second action was not compared in the
first case,79 and because different standards would govern a second
case alleging a different cause of action. 8°

74. See, for example, CogdeLU v. Hospital Center at Orange, 116 N.J. 7, 560 A.2d 1169,
1171-72 (1989) (stating that the issue was whether the plaintiffs failure to join potential defendants in her first action operated as a bar to suing those parties in a second action). No court
has barred a second action based on failure to join or identify a nonparty under "mandatory"
joinder provisions similar to F.R.C.P. 19. See notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
75. See Part III.B.1.a.
76. See Part III.B.l.b.
77. See Part III.B.1.c.
78. See, for example, Selchert v. State, 420 N.W.2d 816, 820 (Iowa 1988) (stating that procedural rules requiring the joinder of all claims and all parties in a single action "may carry
evils worse than the problem to which they are addressed); Part III.B.2.a.
79. See, for example, O'Conner v. State, 70 N.Y.2d 914, 519 N.E.2d 302, 303 (1987)
(finding collateral estoppel inapplicable when comparative negligence was not litigated in the
prior proceeding); Drescher v. Hoffman Motors Corp., 585 F. Supp. 555, 558 (D. Conn. 1984)
(refusing to apply, under Connecticut law, the doctrine of collateral estoppel in a personal injury
action against an automobile distributor when the first suit had established that the plaintiff
was negligent as compared with the owner of the car, but not as compared with the distributor).
See Part III.B.2.b.
80. See, for example, Drescher,585 F. Supp. at 558 (noting that the issues to be decided in
the plaintiffs second suit "either arise under different facts or are to be decided under different
legal standards than the facts and issues of the first case'.
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1. Court Rationales for Barring Successive Suits
a. The Entire Controversy Doctrine
In Cogdell v. Hospital Center at Orange,81 the New Jersey

Supreme Court applied that state's unique entire controversy doctrine82 in determining that a plaintiff must join all possible defendants in one action or lose the chance to recover in subsequent actions
against non-joined parties.83 In Cogdell, the plaintiff delivered a baby
through emergency Cesarean section at the defendant hospital.8 The
baby suffered permanent injury during or shortly after the birth.8 5
The plaintiff sued both her obstetrician and the emergency room
physician for malpractice. 86 Although the parties settled during jury
deliberations, the jury returned a verdict for the defendants, thus
negating the settlement.8 7 The plaintiff appealed the issue of the
preclusive effect of the settlement to the New Jersey Supreme Court,
but the appeal was denied.88
While the appeal was pending, the plaintiff commenced a second action against the hospital, claiming negligent delay in the commencement of the operation. 89 The hospital moved to dismiss, assert-

81. 560 A.2d 1169 (1989).
82. The entire controversy doctrine is a common-law doctrine, to which New Jersey has
accorded constitutional status. N.J. Const., Art. 6, § 2, para. 4. The doctrine has continued to
evolve since its constitutional codification in 1947 so that now it is "a mandatory rule for the
joinder of virtually all causes, claims, and defenses relating to a controversy between the parties
engaged in litigation." Cogdell, 560 A2d at 1173. See also Jones v. Holvey, 29 F.3d 828, 830 (3d
Cir. 1994) (describing the state of the law of res judicata, or claim preclusion, in New Jersey).
The question addressed in Cogdell was whether the doctrine barred a second independent action
against a party not joined in an earlier action based on the same occurence. Cogdell, 560 A.2d
at 1171-72. The Cogdell court stated:
[Tihe entire controversy doctrine appropriately encompasses the mandatory joinder of
parties. Accordingly, we now hold that to the extent possible courts must determine an
entire controversy in a single judicial proceeding and that such a determination necessarily embraces not only joinder of related claims between the parties but also joinder of
all persons who have a material interest in the controversy.
Id. at 1178. See also DiTrolio v. Antiles, 276 N.J. Super. 234, 647 A.2d 1318, 1324-25 (1994)
(discussing the limits of the entire controversy doctrine after Cogdell). For a discussion of the
origins of the doctrine see Kevin Haverty, Note, The Entire ControversyDoctrinein New Jersey
and the Nominal Party Exception: When is the Entire Controversy Not the Entire Controversy?,
23 Rutgers L. J. 341, 344-49 (1992).
83. 560 A.2d at 1178-79.
84. Id. at 1169.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1169-70.
88. Id. at 1170.
89. Id.
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ing that New Jersey's entire controversy doctrine barred a subsequent
independent action against it.9o

The Cogdell court concluded that the joinder of parties was
mandatory under the entire controversy doctrine. 91 The court cited
several factors in its decision, including judicial economy and
avoidance of waste, efficiency and reduction of delay, fairness to the
parties, and the need to adjudicate all claims in one action. 92 The
court also justified its decision by reference to the litigation explosion
burdening judicial resources. 93 Finally, the Court noted that although
the hospital was not involved in the first action, its ability to defend
by pointing to the doctors' role in the plaintiff's injuries had been
severely compromised by the first action.94 The court noted that,
under the facts of Cogdell, a second action would be a wasteful and
95
inefficient reprise of the first suit.

The plaintiff in Cogdell knew long before trial that the hospital
staff had been slow to assemble for the procedure and that the defendant-physicians considered this delay to be a factor in the injury to
the child.9 The plaintiff instituted the second suit because of her
dissatisfaction with the outcome of the first trial.
b. CollateralEstoppel
In Kathios v. General Motors Corporation,97 the First Circuit
Court of Appeals dismissed the plaintiffs product liability claim
against the defendant because plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity
to litigate the issues in the first trial. Kathios was a passenger in an
automobile involved in a single-car accident following a drinking
spree by all the occupants. 98 Kathios settled with the driver and with
one bar at which they drank, but his dram-shop action against a sec-

90. Id.
91. Id. at 1178.
92. Id. at 1173 (quoting 2 State of New Jersey Constitutional Convention of 1947,
Committee on the Judiciary Report § I1(J) 1187 (1947)).
93. Id. at 1177.
94. Id. at 1178 (noting that although "technically the [defendant in the second action's]
interests were not determined in the earlier action, they do not now have the same opportunity
to persuade a jury that will be determining their liability that the former defendants are to be
blamed).
95. Id. Specifically, the court stated: a "second lawsuit, though technically separate and
independent, is in truth not much more than a re-run of the earlier lawsuit. The waste and
inefficiency are obvious." Id.
96. Id.
97. 862 F.2d 944 (1st Cir. 1988).
98. Id. at 945.

756

VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 48:739

ond bar went to trial. 99 Although he presented evidence of damages in
excess of $800,000, the jury returned a verdict for $275,000, and his
motion for additur was denied.100 Two years later, Kathios instituted
a second suit against the manufacturer of the car, General Motors, on
a product liability theory. 101
The Kathios court found that the issues in the second case,
such as damages and comparative negligence of the plaintiff, were
identical to those in the first case. 102 The court observed that the
plaintiff's attempt to relitigate the cause of his injuries was a manifestly inefficient waste of judicial resources and, therefore, could not
be allowed. 0 3 Because Kathios could offer no new evidence apart from
his attempt to proceed under a new theory of liability, the court of

99. Id.
100. Id. The general verdict was presumably reduced under New Hampshire's comparative
fault statute. Id. at 945 n.1.
101. Id. at 945. If plaintiffs are tempted to institute second actions based on dissatisfaction
with the results of an earlier suit, in many cases the plaintiff's second action will rely on a
theory of liability more attenuated than that of the first action and with a statute of limitations
period long enough that the second action is still viable after the first has ended. When the
second action is based on strict liability, some courts refuse to employ comparative negligence
concepts. See, for example, Drescher, 585 F. Supp. at 558 (D. Conn. 1984) (holding that because
different standards apply to a strict liability action than to a negligence action, a second action,
based on strict liability, was not barred when the first action was based solely on negligence).
For a discussion of the issues involved in applying comparative fault in strict-liability cases,
see generally Annotation, Applicability of ComparativeNegligence Doctrine to Actions Based on
Strict Liability in Tort, 9 A.L.R. 4th 633 (1982) (collecting cases); Mark E. Roszkowski and
Robert A. Prentice, Reconciling Comparative Negligence and Strict Liability: A Public Policy
Analysis, 33 St. Louis U. L. J. 19 (1988) (arguing that comparative negligence should be applied
in strict-liability cases only in selective instances when it does not undermine the underlying
rationale of strict liability); John Cirace, A Theory of Negligence and Products Liability, 66 St.
John's L. Rev. 1 (1992) (arguing that negligence standards should be applied to design defect
and defective-warning cases, but not to mismanufactured-products cases); Alan Schwartz,
Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 Yale L. J. 353 (1988)
(proposing true strict liability with contributory negligence as a complete defense); Lisa M.
Ginoza and Curtis B.K. Yuen, Note, Armstrong v. Cione and Hao v. Owens-Illinois: Applying
PureComparativeNegligence Principles to Strict Products LiabilityActions, 10 U. Haw. L. Rev.
393 (1988) (analyzing Hawaii's adoption of a pure form of comparative negligence for product
liability claims and its impact on other tort doctrines); Richard A. Mincer, Case Comment,
Strictly Speaking,
Comparative Negligence Torts-Phillips v. Duro-Last Roofing, Inc.:
Comparative Negligence PrinciplesMust Be Applied to Strict LiabilityActions In Some States,
23 Mem. St. U. L. Rev. 209 (1992) (analyzing Wyoming Supreme Court decision holding that
Wyoming's comparative negligence statute, Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-109, did not apply to strict liability
actions); Shannon J. Skinner, Recent Development, Products Liability-Washington Refuses to
Allow ComparativeNegligence to Reduce a Strict Liability Award--Seay v. Chrysler Corp., 56
Wash. L. Rev. 307 (1981) (criticizing the Washington Supreme Court's decision refusing to allow
a plaintiffs negligence to diminish a strict-liability award).
102. Kathios, 862 F.2d at 946, 948.
103. Id. at 951 (holding that "[cloncerns relating to judicial economy also militate against
allowing plaintiffs to litigate their cases over and over, against one defendant at a time").
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appeals held that Kathios could not maintain a second cause of action
10 4
against General Motors.
Kathios argued that he should be allowed to relitigate the
issue of his comparative negligence as regards each individual defendant in a new action. 1 5 The court found that such repeated litigation
would waste judicial resources0 6 and would put defendants in an
unfair and untenable position because, unless the negligence of all
possible parties is considered in one action, a defendant might be
forced to pay a judgment that is not in proportion to the defendant's
percentage of fault. 0 7 The court hypothesized that a plaintiff who was

ten percent negligent could sue a defendant who was also ten percent
negligent and recover fifty percent of her damages. 0 8 The court
deemed this result unacceptable as against public policy and as
antithetical to the goals of New Hampshire's comparative fault
statute. 0 9
c. StatutoryInterpretation: Implying a One-Action Rule
While the First Circuit Court of Appeals and the New Jersey
Supreme Court relied on judicial doctrines to bar successive actions,
the Kansas Supreme Court relied on its interpretation of the Kansas
Comparative Fault Act"0o to preclude successive actions as to fault in
tort cases."' The Kansas Supreme Court interpreted this "one-action

104. Id.
105. Id. at 950.
106. Id. at 951.
107. Id. at 950-51.
108. Id. The court reasoned:
If, as appellant suggests, a plaintiffs negligence is to be calculated only in relation to
that of the particular respondent(s) whom he elects to sue, then a plaintiff who was, say,
10% negligent, could sue a defendant who was likewise 10% negligent and recover 50%
of his damages. Even if a plaintiffs overall recovery is capped at 100% of actual damages, the upshot remains badly skewed. As a leading text recognizes, "failure to consider the negligence of all tortfeasors, whether parties or not, prejudices the joined defendants who are thus required to bear a greater portion of the plaintiffs loss than is attributable to their fault."
Id. (quoting W. Page Keeton, et al., eds., Prosserand Keeton on the Law of Torts 475-76 (West,
5th ed. 1984)).
109. Id. at 951. The court stated that the outcome of its hypothetical is antithetic to the
objective of New Hampshire's comparative negligence statute, which is "to allocate more
equitably the responsibility for injuries due to negligent conduct on the part of parties on both
sides of a lawsuit.'" Id. (quoting Hurley v. Public Service Co., 123 N.H. 750, 465 A.2d 1217,
1221 (1983)).
110. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-258a (1992).
111. See Eurich v. Alkire, 224 Kan. 236, 579 P.2d 1207, 1208-09 (1978). Specifically, the
Kansas Supreme Court stated:
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rule" in Albertson v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft.112 In
Albertson, a case similar to Kathios v. GeneralMotors,13 the plaintiff
was involved in an automobile accident and sued the driver of the
other vehicle first.14 That trial resulted in a determination of sixty
percent fault to the defendant and forty percent to the plaintiff. 15

Subsequently, Albertson filed a second suit in federal district court
16
against Volkswagen, alleging strict liability for a defective product."
After the defendant moved for summary judgment, the district court
certified the question of whether this second action was allowed under
Kansas law to the Kansas Supreme Court."1
The Kansas court held that the second action was barred by
the finding of comparative fault in the first trial."8 The court reasoned that the first comparative fault action apportioned all possible
fault, both of parties and nonparties, that led to the plaintiffs injury."9 There being no fault remaining to apportion to the defendant
in the second case, the plaintiff was not allowed to bring a second
0

action.12

Looking to the historical background of the enactment, the circumstances attending its
passage, and the purpose to be accomplished by the act.., we believe it was the intent
of the legislature to fully and finally litigate all causes of action and claims for damage
arising out of any act of negligence subject to K.S.. 60-258a. The provision for determining the percentage of causal negligence against each person involved in a negligence
action contemplates that the rights and liabilities of each person should be determined
in one action. Because all issues of liability are determined in one action there can be no
reasonable argument that the issues should be relitigated. Likewise, there is no reasonable argument for the proposition that a claim for damage arising out of one collision
or occurrence should not be presented at the time negligence is originally determined.
Id.
112. 230 Kan. 368, 634 P.2d 1127 (1981).
113. See Part III.B.1.b.
114. 634 P.2d at 1128.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1128-29. Specifically, the district court asked:
Having once obtained a satisfied judgment for a portion of his injuries in a comparative
negligence action, may a plaintiff bring an action to recover damages for the remaining
portion of his injuries against a defendant not a party to the first action, such second
action being based on strict liability in tort?
Id.
118. Id. at 1132.
119. Id.
120. Id. The court stated:
Albertson's injuries were allegedly caused by a combination of the collision and the lack
of crashworthiness of the vehicle in which he rode. They resulted from one occurrence.
Albertson's total injuries were evaluated by the jury and determined to be $275,000.
Albertson was found responsible for 40% of his own injuries; 60% were caused by
others ....
The action is over. Volkswagen could have been sued in state court but
plaintiff chose not to join the corporation for strategic reasons. Albertson is bound by
that decision. Under the doctrine of comparative fault all parties to an occurrence must
have their fault determined in one action, even though some parties cannot be formally
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2. Court Rationales Allowing Successive Suits
a. Statutory Interpretation: FindingNo One-Action Rule
Not every court that has considered the matter, however, has
concluded that its state's comparative negligence statute requires
joinder of all parties in one action.121 In Selchert v. State,12 2 the Iowa
Supreme Court determined that Iowa's statute did not require mandatory joinder. The court held that, under Iowa law, the prior action
did not collaterally estop the plaintiff from bringing a second claim
against a new defendant. 123 According to the court, only the fault of
the parties to the first action had been determined in the previous
suit, and, therefore, the defendant's argument that there was no
longer any fault to allocate in the second action failed. 24 The court
indicated an appreciation for the modern trend toward one-action
rules, but strictly interpreted the Iowa statutes as prohibiting this
result. 25 Although the defendant asked the court to follow the lead of
Albertson, the Iowa court refused to do so, holding that the implementation of a one-action rule would require an act of the legislature.126
The Iowa Supreme Court's refusal to enforce a one-action rule without
explicit authorization from the legislature illustrates the danger of
legislative silence on this issue.

joined or held legally responsible. Those not joined as parties or for determination of
fault escape liability.
Id.
121. See David Polin, Annotation, ComparativeNegligence: Judgment Allocating Fault in
Action Against Less Than All Potential Defendants as PrecludingSubsequent Action Against
PartiesNot Sued in OriginalAction, 4 A.L.R. 5th 753, 764-71 (1992) (collecting cases which have
held that all fault need not be determined in a single comparative-fault action).
122. 420 N.W.2d 816 (Iowa 1988).
123. Id. at 819-21.
124. Id. at 819-20.
125. Id. at 820.
126. Id. Specifically the court said:
Like Kansas, our court has recognized that "the modem and enlightened trend is
to combine in one action for trial all claims and actions involving several persons in a
single incident." But, unlike our colleagues in Kansas, we are unwilling to rewrite our
comparative fault act or rules of procedure to achieve this noble objective.
Id. (quoting Hyde v. Buckalew, 393 N.W.2d 800, 804 (Iowa 1986)). The court also noted that
there are commentators who question the wisdom of one-action rules. Id. at 820-21 (citing John
C. McCoid, A Single Packagefor Multi-PartyDisputes, 28 Stan. L. Rev. 707, 728 (1976)).
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b. Issues Not Precluded
Some courts have also refused to apply the judicial doctrines of
res judicata and collateral estoppel to preclude subsequent actions.
Rather, they have allowed the second suit to go forward because the
first trial did not involve the second defendant, nor did it resolve
issues relating to the second defendant's fault.
For example, in O'Connor v. State127 the plaintiffs decedent
was killed by a bicyclist while crossing a street on property owned by
the state.12 8 In a previous action, the plaintiff had sued the bicyclist
and others involved in the time trials in which the bicyclist was participating.129 In that action, the jury found the plaintiffs decedent
sixty percent at fault.130 The plaintiff then sued the state, which had
allowed the use of the property for the time trials.' 3'
The New York Court of Appeals rejected the state's argument
that collateral estoppel barred relitigation of the comparative negligence of the decedent. 32 The court reasoned that the relative negligence between the decedent and the state was not at issue in the first
case. 33
In the second action the state and the decedent were each
found to be fifty percent at fault. 34 The court allowed the state to
contest the amount of damages found in the first case, but the plaintiff was estopped from claiming damages in excess of those found in
the first case. 3 5 The result was that the decedent was found sixty
percent at fault in relation to the bicyclist, fifty percent at fault in
relation to the state, and the amount of damages sustained by the
decedent was found to be different in each case. Such a result leads to
confusion and inefficency, and erodes confidence in the accuracy of the
legal system by allowing multiple percentages of fault and multiple
findings of the amount of damages, which should, in theory, be impossible.

127. 70 N.Y.2d 914, 519 N.E.2d 302 (1987).
128. Id at 302.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 303.
133. Id. The court also noted that the state could not have been a party to the first case,
which involved a jury trial. Therefore, "claimant never had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
decedent's comparative negligence in relationship to the State." Id. See note 62 for an argu-

ment that states should subject themselves to jury trials to avoid this result.
134. 519 N.E.2d at 303.
135. O'Connorv. State, 126 A.D.2d 120, 512 N.Y.S.2d 536, 540 (1987) (lower court decision).
The state did succeed in reducing the amount of damages. Id.
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Similarly, in Drescherv. Hoffman Motors Corporation,136 a federal district court refused to find issues relating to the second suit
precluded by the first suit. In Drescher,the plaintiff was an automotive salesman and technician who sold, installed, and repaired elec17
tronic devices designed to start an automobile by remote control."
While servicing a device that he had previously sold, Drescher was
injured when the car on which he was working accidentally started
and struck him.1"8 In his suit against the owner of the car, the Girard
Motor Sales Company, Inc., on whose premises he was working, the
jury found Drescher to be eighty percent at fault for his injuries."39
Following the unsuccessful conclusion of this first action, Drescher
sued Hoffman Motors, the distributor of the car, on theories of negligence in both design and warning, breach of implied warranty, and
0
strict tort liabilty.14
The district court rejected Hoffman Motors's collateral estoppel
argument that all issues material to Drescher's action against it had
been litigated in the previous suit.'41 As did the court in O'Connor,
the court reasoned that Drescher's negligence in relation to Hoffman
Motors had not been at issue in the first case. 4 2 Further, the court
found that Drescher's failure to join Hoffman Motors in the earlier
case did not justify disallowing the second action altogether.'43
C. The Need for Legislative and JudicialAction
As these cases illustrate, courts have reached inconsistent
results when deciding whether to bar successive suits involving the
same occurrence. Courts have interpreted similar comparative fault
statutes in inconsistent ways. For example, the statute which the
Kansas Supreme Court interpreted in Albertson to mandate a oneaction rule is not substantially different from the Iowa statute which

136. 585 F. Supp. 555 (D. Conn. 1984).
137. Id. at 556.
138. Id.
139. Id. Because Drescher was comparatively more culpable than the defendant,
Connecticut's comparative fault statutes precluded recovery. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 557-58. Specifically, Hoffman claimed that Drescher's negligent misuse of the

product had been conclusively established in the first action. Id. at 558.
142. Id. at 558.
143. Id. at 558 n.1 (referring to such a result as "draconian"). The court noted that the
failure to join Hoffman Motors in the earlier action may have been a reasonable mistake. Id.
This possibility led the court to refuse Hoffman Motors' defense.
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was found not to support such a rule in Selchert.14 Moreover, a court
that agrees with the policy goal of combining all actions in one trial,
as did the Selchert court, may be unwilling to enforce such a rule
absent clear legislative authorization. 145 Thus, state legislatures
should expressly provide that all defendants must be joined in one
action and that subsequent actions will be barred.
However, even without express legislative authorization, the
decisions in Cogdell, Kathios, and Albertson are justifiable. 14 Before
the modification of joint and several liability, the system fostered
efficiency. 47 A court should readily assume that the legislature, in
adopting comparative fault, did not intend to create the inefficiencies
attendant to serial suits.
Courts cannot remain unwilling to assume that the
legislatures only inadvertently eliminated the efficiencies of joint and
several liability. Absent express legislative authorization, a court
should look to the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata to
preclude the inefficient results of serial suits in comparative fault
jurisdictions.
IV. A MANDATE FOR ONE ACTION AS TO FAULT

A Justificationof One Action
A rule requiring plaintiffs to join all possible defendants in a
single action would serve the goals of efficiency, fairness, and consistency of judgments in comparative fault jurisdictions. That is, a oneaction rule would recapture the inherent efficiency of joint liability
systems, retain the fairness of comparative fault, and reduce the
chance for inconsistent judgments, which undermine confidence in the
judicial system. This Part discusses each of these policy goals in turn.

144. Compare Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-258a with Iowa Code Ann. § 668. The Kansas statute
simply provides that defendants may join other parties whom they believe are at fault. Kan.
Stat. Ann. § 60-258a(c).
145. See Selchert,420 N.W.2d at 820.
146. See Part V.AL Although many courts were reluctant to institute comparative negligence unilaterally because they thought the legislature should authorize such a sweeping
change in the law, as regards successive suits, the courts are reluctant to act because they

believe the legislatures have not. The history of comparative negligence shows, however, that
the legislatures respect the decisions of the courts in this area. See Part IMA. In addition, it is
unlikely that by adopting comparative fault, the legislatures intended to impose inefficiencies on
the courts.
147. See text accompanying notes 68-70.
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1. Recapturing Efficiency
Almost everyone agrees there is too much litigation. 148 While
we might disagree as to the best course of action to decrease the load
on courts, we should at least be able to agree that duplicative litigation wastes scarce judicial resources 4 9 and should be eliminated. 150 As
Professors James and Hazard have observed, the inefficiency and
inconsistency involved in multiple suits is easily avoidable.' 5'
As detailed above,1 52 the shift to comparative fault inadvertently decreased judicial efficiency by encouraging strategic behavior
on the part of plaintiffs. By eliminating the evils of one opportunity
for strategic behavior, the selective suing of deep pockets, state legislatures unwittingly created another, allowing plaintiffs to litigate
fault twice against separate defendants.
Some commentators have suggested that joinder rules should
be expanded to enable courts to take a more active role in avoiding
duplicative litigation. 53 Multiple litigation should never occur simply
because of joinder deficiencies.M Duplicative litigation is especially
troubling when it results from a conscious choice by plaintiffs to increase the likelihood and amount of their recovery. Though some
would leave joinder to the discretion of parties in the belief that they
have incentive enough to create efficiency, 55 such choices should be

148. See Freer, 50 U. Pitt. L. Rev. at 810 (cited in note 59) (stating that most observers
agree there is too much litigation, specifically duplicative litigation).
149. McCoid, 28 Stan. L. Rev. at 707 (cited in note 126). But see Elinor P. Schroeder,
Relitigation of Common Issues: The Failure of Nonparty Preclusion and an Alternative
Proposal, 67 Iowa L. Rev. 917, 954-58 (1982) (questioning the impact of relitigation on efficiency).
150. Freer, 50 U. Pitt. L. Rev. at 811 (cited in note 59).
151. Fleming James and Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Civil Procedure § 10.24 at 582 (Little,
Brown, 3d ed. 1985). Specifically, they argue:
There is simply no reason why a multiple-claim, multiple-party controversy arising
within the United States should not be submissible to a single tribunal for a consistent
adjudication of the various claims and liabilities. Failure in this objective has the consequences of multiplying and prolonging litigation, multiplying private and public legal
costs, and bringing the system ofjustice into unnecessary disrepute.
Id.
152. See Part III.
153. See, for example, Freer, 50 U. Pitt. L. Rev. at 813 (cited in note 59).
154. Luther L. McDougal III, Judicial Jurisdiction: From a Contacts to an Interest
Analysis, 35 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 24 (1982) (arguing that only in rare cases should due process
require multiple litigation over similar factual issues).
155. See, for example, Uniform Model Comparative Fault Act § 2(a), 12 U.L.A. at 50,
comment (cited in note 64) (enacting this policy choice).
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removed from parties who are likely to engage in strategic behavior
156
that places undue strains on judicial resources.
Preclusion of relitigation is particularly justified when a plaintiff initiates a second suit against a defendant whom she could have
joined in the first action, but was either held in reserve' 57 or was
sought out following an unsuccessful result in the first case.158 In
addition to decreasing the total volume of suits, requiring plaintiffs to
join all possible defendants in one action would provide quicker and
more streamlined litigation. 59
Mandatory joinder may cause plaintiffs to join defendants
whom they would not initially sue under the present system, 160 but
courts can dispose of unfounded claims relatively early in the
litigation.161 If a party whom the plaintiff otherwise would not have
joined is found liable, the outcome serves efficiency because it better
serves the deterrence goal of the tort system by introducing a
deterrent to an at-fault party who otherwise would not have been
identified.
2. Retaining Fairness
Courts and legislatures adopted and codified comparative fault
in the place of joint liability because they believed the results under
comparative fault were more just.' 62 Any modification or interpreta-

tion of this fault system should reinforce this choice. As discussed
above, legislatures that adopted some form of comparative fault valued the goal of fairness to defendants over that of full recovery for
plaintiffs.' 63 Joint liability, while it produced an efficient system, did
not produce a fair one.
More inclusive joinder reinforces this policy choice in favor of
greater fairness. 164 Determining all fault in a single action by requir156. McCoid, 28 Stan. L. Rev. at 714 (cited in note 126) (stating that "the presence of
competing values requires a weighing process that, in the hands of one whose decision is colored
by self-interest, may be highly suspect").
157. As in Cogdell. See Part III.B.1.
158. As in Kathios. See Part III.B.2.
159. Freer, 50 U. Pitt. L. Rev. at 814 (cited in note 59).
160. Id. A plaintiff such as Kathios might, for example, be tempted to sue General Motors
as a matter of course whenever an accident occurs involving one of GM's vehicles. See also
McCoid, 28 Stan. L. Rev. at 728 (cited in note 126).
161. This would be accomplished on a motion for dismissal based on failure to state a claim,
see, for example, Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6), or for summary judgment, see, for example, Tenn. R.
Civ. P. 56.02.
162. Twerski, The Joint Tortfeasor, 22 U.C. Davis L. Rev. at 1130-32 (cited in note 51).
163. See note 27.
164. Freer, 50 U. Pitt. L. Rev. at 814 (cited in note 59).
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ing the plaintiff to join all possible parties would protect second defendants from the harm that may result if the litigation goes forward
in their absence. 165 The defendants in serial cases would face severe
disadvantages if they were forced to defend themselves in a jurisdiction that allows only the fault of the parties to be at issue. 166 It would
also protect plaintiffs in jurisdictions where the fault of nonparties
from "whipsawing"
can be considered by preventing the defendants
67
the plaintiff through an empty chair defense.
6
Because it creates the possibility of inconsistent judgments, 8
multiple litigation can force defendants to pay a greater share of the
plaintiff's damages than they would have if the fault of all parties
were determined in one action. 69 Yet, legislatures adopted comparative fault to eliminate this very result. 70 A rule of mandatory joinder
would better serve the 71policy choice made by the legislatures in adopt1
ing comparative fault.
Defendants to second suits also often become the victims of
desperate plaintiffs who feel that their action against the party primarily (if not solely) responsible for their injury resulted in an unacceptable judgment. 72 In these second suits, plaintiffs often rely on
attenuated causes of action that may not have been appropriate in the
first case. 173 Strategic use of successive suits unfairly and inefficiently
165. Id. See also Cogdell, 560 A.2d at 1178 (explaining that the second defendant will not
have the same ability to convince the jury that the first defendant was at fault).
166. See note 64. In this situation, the following scenario could develop: The first jury
could find the plaintiff to be 50% at fault and the defendant 50%. In the second suit this previous holding would have no preclusive effect since each case by definition compares only the fault
of the parties to the suit. Thus, if the second jury found the plaintiff and defendant equally at
fault, the plaintiff would recover 100% of her damages (50% from each defendant) while being
found 50% at fault in each case. This possibility illustrates the need for the so-called "empty
chair" defense. The result becomes even more confusing if the two juries are allowed to find a
different measure of damages. See, for example, O'Connor,512 N.Y.S.2d at 540 (allowing this
result).
167. Freer, 50 U. Pitt. L. Rev. at 824 (cited in note 59) (also noting that plaintiffs would
avoid statute of limitation problems by suing all possible defendants at once and would reduce
the need to make determinations about the defendants' relative culpability and their ability to
pay at an early stage in the litigation).
168. See Part IV.A.3.
169. For example, if the two cases posited in the hypothetical in note 166 were tried
together, the plaintiff and both defendants would likely have been found 33% at fault each.
When the suits are tried separately, each defendant overpays by 17%, and the result creates
over-deterrence, which, in turn, produces inefficiency. Even in jurisdictions allowing an empty
chair defense, unfairness to one party may result. See text accompanying notes 179-80.
170. See Part II.B.
171. See note 51.
172. See, for example, Kathios, 862 F.2d 944, discussed in Part III.B.l.b.
173. Again, Kathios is a clear example. Packaging claims into one action would encourage
plaintiffs to bring claims that they might not otherwise assert. Freer, 50 U. Pitt. L. Rev. at 814
(cited in note 59). If these causes of action are truly attenuated, then courts will dismiss them

766-

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:739

forces serial defendants into the role of insuring the plaintiff against
unsatisfactory recovery.
3. Reducing Inconsistency
A final justification for a one-action rule to determine fault is
the avoidance of inconsistent judgments. Courts and commentators
have become increasingly vocal in their concerns over the effect inconsistent judgments have on public confidence in the integrity of the
judicial system. 174
Inconsistent judgments from multiple suits involving a single
occurrence with multiple party defendants can harm any of the parties to the suits, including the plaintiff. To take an example from
Professor McCoid's article on inconsistent judgments, if a single nonnegligent plaintiff, B, who should recover from A or C, proceeds
against A and C serially, it is possible that B will recover from neither, solely because of A's and C's use of the empty chair defense in
their independent suits. 175 One might argue that when plaintiffs
choose to proceed in this manner for strategic purposes, they take the
risk of nonrecovery. 176 This scenario seems particularly unjust, however, when the plaintiff is completely innocent and can satisfactorally
prove both damages and A's or C's liability. The result of mandatory
joinder would, therefore, protect plaintiffs.
Although the possibility that a plaintiff might lose both cases
may encourage plaintiffs to join all parties voluntarily, 177 a one-action

rule would prevent plaintiffs from seeking out defendants who might
be liable on different and often attenuated theories once a first trial
has ended in an unsatisfactory result.178 Legislatures and courts
should expressly preclude this result by denying plaintiffs this choice.

on the defendant's motion for summary judgment. If these causes of action prove sustainable,
then the tort goal of deterrence is more efficiently served because plaintiffs could pursue claims
that would not have otherwise been brought.
174. See, for example, Vennerberg Farms, Inc. v. IGF Ins. Co., 405 N.W.2d 810, 814 (Iowa
1987) (noting that the purpose of the doctrine of judicial estoppel is "to protect the integrity of
the judicial process by preventing intentional inconsistency"); State v. Bell, 55 N.J. 239, 260
A.2d 849, 854 (1970) (stating that "the integrity of the courts" required the resolution of two
inconsistent convictions). See also McCoid, 28 Stan. L. Rev. at 707 (cited in note 126).
175. John C. McCoid II, InconsistentJudgments, 48 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 487, 507 (1991).
176. This situation could arise, and often does, when the plaintiff is forced to proceed in two
actions if, for example, both defendants were not amenable to service of process in the same
jurisdiction or if one defendant was a governmental entity and the other was a private party.
See note 62.
177. McCoid, 48 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. at 508 (cited in note 175).
178. As in Kathios, 862 F.2d 944, Part III.B.l.b.
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Serial suits with inconsistent results also disrupt the dual tort
goals of deterrence and compensation. If the plaintiff, B, sues A and
C serially, and in the first case, B v. A, A is found to be forty percent
at fault and C, a nonparty, sixty percent at fault, B recovers forty
percent of her damages from A.17 9 If in the second action, B v. C, A,
now the nonparty, is found to be twenty percent at fault and C eighty
percent, B will recover only sixty percent of her damages from C,
constituting full compensation. These inconsistent judgments necessarily mean, however, that either A has overpaid or C has underpaid,
depending on whether the adjudication of fault was correct in the first
or second case. This result fails to serve the deterrence function of
tort law because one party has been overdeterred and one party
underdeterred. 180
Harm to the compensatory goal of tort law is illustrated by a
third situation in which the nonparty is found to be mostly at fault in
each case. Assume, for example, that in B v. A, A is found to be
twenty percent at fault and C, the nonparty, is found to be eighty
percent at fault. Then, in B v. C, C is found to be twenty percent at
fault and the nonparty, A, is found to be eighty percent at fault. This
situation serves neither the compensatory nor the deterrent goals of
the tort system. The plaintiff has underrecovered by sixty percent,
and one or both defendants have been underdeterred by an equal
percentage.
B. Legislatures and Courts Should Enforce a One-Action Rule
As detailed above, a one-action rule would improve procedural
efficiency, promote fairness to all parties involved in the incident
leading to the suit, and reduce inconsistent judgments, which undermine both public confidence in the courts and the tort goals of deterrence and compensation. State legislatures should, therefore, enact
statutes allowing plaintiffs to pursue only one action per incident and
barring any further action by the plaintiff. To allow the state courts

179. This hypothetical assumes that the fault of nonparties is considered in the action. If it
is not (as it would not be in a Uniform Comparative Fault jurisdiction), the result would be de
facto joint liability since A's liability, in the absence of another defendant, would be one hundred
percent. C's fault would never be determined. Such a result would be efficient only if C was, in
fact, without fault.
180. But see McCoid, 48 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. at 510 (cited in note 175) (stating that
"[wlhen liability is cumulative but independent... it seems to me that inconsistency presents
no problem per se". Professor McCoid, however, fails to take account of the inefficient allocation of deterrence.
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to reach all possible defendants, the statutes may need to grant
broader jurisdictional authority as well. 181
The Kansas comparative fault statute provides a possible
starting point in constructing such a law.182 The Kansas statute provides for the joinder of additional parties on the motion of a named
defendant. 183 The plaintiff must accept the joinder.'8 Plaintiffs, however, may be in a better position than defendants to identify all potentially liable parties185 and are the only party with an incentive not to
join possibly negligent parties.

86

To be effective, state statues should provide for more than the
mere joinder of all parties. They should also make explicit what the
Kansas Supreme Court found implicit in Kansas' joinder provision,
that all causes of action arising out of a single occurance or transaction should be litigated in one action. 8 7 Subsequent litigation should
be strictly prohibited.
Absent express provisions in their comparative fault statutes
authorizing a one-action rule, courts should take judicial notice of the
inefficiencies created by serial litigation and invoke the doctrines of
collateral estoppel and res judicata to prevent plaintiffs from engaging in strategic and inefficient behavior. Courts should read comparative fault statutes as an effort on the part of the legislatures to increase fairness and efficiency. In light of such a reading, courts need
not shrink from application of judicially created remedies to enforce
fair and efficient litigation. The courts in many states enacted comparative fault by judicial action, without waiting for the legislatures

181. See id. at 492-93 (advocating congressional adoption of nationwide service of process
for a wider variety of claims).
182. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-258a(c) provides:
On motion of any party against whom a claim is asserted for negligence resulting in
death, personal injury, property damage or economic loss, any other person whose
causal negligence is claimed to have contributed to such death, personal injury, property
damage or economic loss, shall be joined as an additional party to the action.
Kansas' one-action rule was based on the interpretation of this section. See Eurich, 579 P.2d at
1208-09..
183. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-258a(c). The ability to join all possible defendants in one forum
enables a court to exercise authority over the entire controversy, thereby promoting judicial
efficiency. McDougal, 35 Vand. L. Rev. at 37 (cited in note 154).
184. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-258a(c).
185. To the extent that defendants know of a party who may be at fault of whom the
plaintiff is ignorant, the defendants will always seek joinder in order to decrease their own
exposure to liability.
186. See note 63.
187. Eurich, 579 P.2d at 1208. Because the act allows for cross-claims, the Kansas decision
bars all parties to a comparative negligence action from bringing a later claim that arose out of
the incident. Id. at 1209.
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to act. The same can and should be done in the area of one-action
rules.
V. CONCLUSION

Under joint and several liability, plaintiffs recovered the entire
amount of their damages in one action. Jurisdictions that either
modified or abolished joint liability inadvertently discarded an effective tool for guaranteeing procedural efficiency, fair adjudication of
claims, and consistent judgments. Simply put, the shift to comparative fault removed the incentives for defendants to join other potentially liable parties without placing comparable incentives on plaintiffs. Thus, the comparative fault statutes create the possibility of
serial suits involving the same occurrence.
Plaintiffs have discovered this weakness and exploit it by
using multiple actions to increase their recoveries. The results are
both inefficient and unfair to defendants. However, the efficiency of a
joint liability system is not inexorably lost in a comparative fault
regime. It can be recaptured. It should be recaptured. Requiring
plaintiffs to join in one action all potentially liable persons serves the
same goals that led to the adoption of comparative fault. A system
that requires plaintiffs to litigate their claims in one action would
promote efficiency, fairness, and consistency, goals that are ,becoming
increasingly important in a litigious society.
Courts are justified in using judicially created preclusion doctrines or statutory interpretation to reach this outcome on their own,
but such a result leaves the ultimate discretion to preclude a serial
suit in the hands of the courts on a case-by-case basis. When a court
will not preclude successive suits involving the same occurrence because of a perceived need to defer to the legislature, state legislatures
should recast their comparative fault statutes to provide for a system
in which a plaintiff can and must sue all parties in one action.
John Scott Hickman*
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